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ABSTRACT Alesina and Giuliano illustrate that strong family ties lead to lower geographical mobility and
reduced labour force participation of young and female individuals. We extend their analysis by arguing that
the effect of strong family ties on economic outcomes depends on a country’s level of economic and
institutional development. This cross-country heterogeneity arises because strong family ties not only
foster traditional family values (which have disruptive effects on economic outcomes), but also provide
economically valuable social networks – especially in societies characterised by weak institutions and limited
market access. Empirical evidence using the European and World Value Surveys (EVS/WVS) are supportive of
our theoretical argument.
1. Introduction
Alesina and Giuliano (2010) show that strong family ties are causally related to several factors
disruptive to economic growth, including lower labour force participation of young and female
individuals and lower geographical mobility (see also Alesina, Algan, Cahuc, & Giuliano, 2015;
Alesina & Giuliano, 2013). Subsequent studies illustrate similar negative effects of strong family ties
on the labour force participation of elderly individuals, on individuals’ interpersonal trust (Alesina &
Giuliano, 2011, 2013; Ermisch & Gambetta, 2010) and on overall economic dynamism (Duranton,
Rodríguez-Pose, & Sandall, 2009).
In this article, we maintain that allowance should be made for cross-country heterogeneity in the
effect of family ties (for similar claims in different settings, see Cervellati, Jung, Sunde, &
Vischer, 2014; Gërxhani, 2004). The underlying argument starts from the observation that existing
studies’ theoretical reasoning mostly refers to the connection between strong family ties and
(traditional) family values. For instance, female labour force participation (LFP) is argued to
decline with strong family ties because it is associated with a more traditional view of a woman’s
role in society (Alesina & Giuliano, 2010). However, in our view, family ties can also play a key
role in the establishment of economically valuable networks (Wahba & Zenou, 2005) through,
for instance, marriages (Luke, Munshi, & Rosenzweig, 2004; Rosenzweig & Stark, 1989; Wang,
2013). Rosenzweig and Stark (1989), for instance, show that marital arrangements, which establish
a new network with the family of the spouse, mitigate farmers’ income volatility in rural India.
Luke et al. (2004) similarly find that family networks, again organised around marriages, increase
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individuals’ performance in urban labour markets in both Kenya and India. Wang (2013) uses the
exogenous shock of the death of the father-in-law to show the causal effect of family networks on
earnings; the loss of the father-in-law is found to induce a 7 per cent decrease in a man’s earnings.
Hence, family-based networks reflect a capacity to extend one’s connections, and might thereby
allow access to economically valuable opportunities (Montgomery, 1991; Munshi, 2003, Wahba &
Zenou, 2005).1
Crucially, family networks are likely to matter more for economic outcomes in developing
countries. At a risk of generalisation, developing countries tend to have weaker formal institutions
(Dreher, Méon, & Schneider, 2014). As informal institutions – such as the family – become a
substitute for formal institutions when the latter are incomplete (Dreher et al., 2014; Gërxhani,
2004; Helmke & Levitsky, 2004), family networks can play a central role for individuals’ social and
economic needs in such settings. This implies, however, that any positive effect of family networks on
labour market outcomes (Luke et al., 2004; Rosenzweig & Stark, 1989; Wang, 2013) will be
particularly forceful in developing countries. Even when there is a general negative impact of
traditional family values on LFP (as argued in Alesina et al. [2015] and Alesina and Giuliano
[2010, 2013]), the overall effect of strong family ties thus is likely to still vary across countries
depending on their level of economic and institutional development. Specifically, one would expect
weaker disruptive effects of strong family ties on economic behaviour in less affluent, underdeveloped
countries.
A similar argument can also be made for the link between strong family ties and individuals’
interpersonal trust. Strong family ties are generally argued to reduce the need for social contacts
with people outside the family, because individuals’ needs are taken care off within the family
(Alesina & Giuliano, 2013; Ermisch & Gambetta, 2010). This closed network undermines
individuals’ ability to judge others’ trustworthiness (thereby reducing interpersonal trust), and
decreases their access to opportunities outside the family (impeding their economic progress).2
Yet, this line of argument again pays too little attention to the potential role of family networks in
developing, low-income countries. In such settings, as mentioned, the network effects induced by
strong family ties emphatically increase people’s contact possibilities outside the family and
buttress the availability of economically valuable opportunities (Luke et al., 2004; Rosenzweig
& Stark, 1989; Wang, 2013). As before, therefore, the effect of strong family ties on social trust is
likely to display cross-country heterogeneity depending on countries’ levels of economic and
institutional development.
Section 2 describes the dataset and estimation strategy employed to test for cross-country
heterogeneity in the effect of family ties on economic outcomes. The main findings are summarised
in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 contains a concluding discussion.
2. Data and Estimation Approach
Following Alesina and Giuliano (2010, 2011, 2013), our empirical analysis is based on data from all
currently completed waves of the EVS/WVS. This dataset covers 99 countries and roughly 220,000
individuals (though not all countries are represented in every wave). Using these data, we estimate the
following regression equation (where i refers to individuals and t to survey waves):
Yi;t ¼ aþ b1 Family Tiesi;t þ b2 Controlsi;t þ ei;t (1)
Yi,t is a vector containing measures of young, female and elderly labour force participation (that is,
indicator variables equal to 1 if the respondent is active in the labour market, 0 otherwise), geo-
graphical mobility (that is, indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent is co-resident in his/her
parents’ house [Alesina & Giuliano, 2010]) and interpersonal trust (that is, indicator variable equal to 1
if the respondent believes that most people can be trusted). The actual survey question on interpersonal
trust reads: ‘Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too
2 G. Daniele & B. Geys
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careful in dealing with people?’ Respondents can either agree with the former part of the statement
(in which case they are coded as 1 in our trust measure), or with the latter part of the statement
(in which case they receive value 0). Note also that young (elderly) individuals are defined as between
15 and 29 (55 and 65) years of age.
Our measure of the strength of family ties combines information from three separate survey
questions (Alesina et al., 2015; Alesina & Giuliano, 2010, 2011, 2013; Bertrand & Schoar, 2006).
These are, respectively, related to family’s importance to the respondent, his/her evaluation of the
duties and responsibilities of parents towards children, and his/her evaluation of children’s duties
and responsibilities towards their parents.3 We combine these questions using a principal
components analysis (PCA), and employ the first principal component as our main explanatory
variable.4 As shown in detail by Alesina and Giuliano (2013), Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon
countries rank lowest on the resulting scale, while a heterogeneous group of African, Asian and
South American countries rank highest. It is clear from the questions employed (see note 3) that our
analysis is predominantly based on measures of family values and does not explicitly introduce a
direct measure of family networks. Still, our underlying assumption is that the strength of family
values is related positively to the strength of family networks. Although the two concepts are clearly
different, it is plausible to assume a positive correlation between them, which is all we require for
the analysis below.
The vector Controlsi,t contains variables reflecting individuals’ sex, age, age squared, marital status
and education, as well as country and survey fixed effects and the interaction of survey and country
fixed effects. Although this follows Alesina and Giuliano (2010, 2013), we also experimented with a
more extended set of controls incorporating individuals’ income and religiosity. As this does not affect
any of the inferences below, we do not report these additional results in detail here. Summary statistics
for all variables are provided in Table 1.
Table 1. Summary statistics
Variable Observations Mean Std Dev. Min Max
Family ties (see Section 3 for details) 269085 8.76E-09 1.111511 −5.84373 0.789682
Trust (see Section 3 for details) 405490 0.29075 0.454109 0 1
LFP (see Section 3 for details) 405271 0.635197 0.481375 0 1
Geographical mobility (see Section 3 for
details)
318494 0.275236 0.446634 0 1
Interest in politics 380171 2.640827 0.959913 4 1
Sign petition 379239 2.001566 0.816958 3 1
Joining in boycotts 368583 2.498189 0.658263 3 1
Attending demonstrations 377978 2.281715 0.745397 3 1
Joining strikes 302315 2.699152 0.559341 3 1
Occupying buildings 297367 2.829285 0.430827 3 1
Age 413876 42.14841 16.7231 14 108
Sex (1 for female, 0 for male) 419345 0.525424 0.499354 0 1
Married (1 for married, 0 otherwise) 424099 0.045808 0.209068 0 1
Education (1 for lower education, 2 for middle
education, 3 for higher education)
338262 1.865442 0.739948 1 3
Income (1 for lowest income, 10 for highest
income)
308616 4.65622 2.438972 1 10
Religiosity (1 if the respondent belongs to a
religious denomination, 0 otherwise)
329054 0.79418 0.4043 0 1
Survey Wave (1 for 1st wave, 6 for last wave) 424099 3.823836 1.487118 1 6
World Bank development classification
(see Section 3 for details)
420319 2.95035 1.032966 1 4
Government effectiveness (see Section 3.2 for
details)
311922 2.937157 1.010256 1 4
Regulatory quality (see Section 3.2 for details) 320577 2.977016 1.027109 1 4
Rule of law (see Section 3.2 for details) 330136 2.766151 1.077019 1 4
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To test for cross-country heterogeneity in the effect of family ties, we run Equation (1) for different
subcategories of countries depending on their level of economic and institutional development using
the World Bank development classification.5 This classification is based on gross national income
(GNI) per capita, and separates four groups of countries: that is, low income; low–medium income;
upper–medium income; and high income. Although we test the robustness of our results to this
classification below, we use it in the main analysis for three reasons. First, it is a well-established
indicator of countries’ development. Second, GNI per capita is strongly positively correlated with the
strength of formal institutions, which represents the key driving force behind our theoretical argument
in Section 2. Finally, the World Bank classification started in 1987 and is updated annually. This
allows incorporating countries’ development over time, which is important since most countries in our
sample (60 out of 99) switch category over the four decades covered by our analysis (note that such
switches are not necessarily upwards). Figure 1 illustrates means and standard deviations of the family
ties’ variable in the four groups of countries. In line with Alesina and Giuliano (2010, 2013), family
ties weaken with a country’s level of development, although, importantly, significant variation remains
within each group of countries.
Before discussing the results, it is important to note that Alesina and Giuliano (2010) deal
extensively with the problem of reverse causality – that is, the fact that individuals suffering economic
misfortune need to rely more heavily on their family’s resources, which might impact their perception
of family ties – by looking at inherited family ties among a subsample of second-generation
immigrants. The key identifying assumption is that the strength of family ties is generally persistent
across generations and is related to historical family structures (Galasso & Profeta, 2012). To preserve
space, and because we rely on the same dataset as Alesina and Giuliano (2010, 2013), our analysis will
not repeat these causality tests.
3. Results
3.1. Baseline Results
Table 2 reports our main findings using OLS.6 In column 1, we employ the full sample of countries as
in Alesina and Giuliano (2010, 2011, 2013). Columns 2 to 5 report results for, respectively, the
subsample of low income (column 2), low–middle income (column 3), middle–upper income
Figure 1. Family ties means and standard deviations.
Notes: The x axis shows the four groups of countries distinguished by the World Bank development classification.
The y axis presents average levels and standard deviations of the family ties’ variable (higher values correspond to
stronger family ties).
4 G. Daniele & B. Geys
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(column 4) and high income (column 5) countries. To preserve space, and because they are generally
equivalent to those reported in Alesina and Giuliano (2010, 2011, 2013), we do not present the
coefficients of the control variables.
Column 1 shows that the effect of strong family ties on the different dependent variables in the
entire sample is similar, both in terms of effect size and statistical significance, to Alesina and Giuliano
(2010, 2011, 2013).7 Specifically, family ties have a negative and substantively meaningful effect on
social trust, geographical mobility, female and youth LFP, but do not significantly affect elderly LFP.
The remaining columns in Table 2, however, indicate that this negative relation is mostly driven by
developed, high-income countries. Indeed, while all coefficient estimates in column 5 are negative and
statistically significant (except for elderly LFP), moving towards less-developed, lower-income coun-
tries leads to substantively and/or statistically weaker effect sizes for female and young LFP. For the
measures of geographical mobility and interpersonal trust, the negative effect of strong family ties is
even reversed when the level of development is sufficiently low. Except for elderly and female LFP,
Table 2. Main results on family ties, trust and economic outcomes
Entire
sample
Low
income
Low–middle
income
Upper–middle
income
High
income
Trust
Family ties −0.006 0.014 −0.003 −0.008 −0.010
(6.67)** (5.03)** (1.50) (4.91)** (6.82)**
Controls A&G YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.11 0.05 0.12 0.05 0.13
N 218,465 28,385 48,853 59,512 78,330
Women LFP
Family ties −0.008 −0.005 −0.008 −0.010 −0.007
(5.45)** (1.21) (2.50)* (3.66)** (3.42)**
Controls A&G YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.24 0.27 0.23 0.24 0.20
N 98,779 12,320 23,242 27,662 34,029
Young LFP
Family ties −0.005 0.003 −0.006 −0.007 −0.008
(3.61)** (0.82) (2.01)* (2.84)** (4.25)**
Controls A&G YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.31 0.41 0.32 0.29 0.19
N 44,601 7,144 11,969 13,229 11,708
Geographical mobility
Family ties −0.004 0.003 −0.002 −0.003 −0.005
(4.34)** (1.10) (1.27) (1.95) (3.92)**
Controls A&G YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.38 0.36 0.36 0.39 0.38
N 44,601 29,655 43,468 40,931 44,875
Elderly LFP
Family ties −0.005 0.000 −0.009 −0.001 −0.006
(1.89) (0.05) (1.35) (0.11) (1.47)
Controls A&G YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.26 0.30 0.26 0.24 0.28
N 27,182 2,058 5,470 7,653 11,431
Notes: OLS estimations, t-statistics based on robust standard errors between brackets. The dependent variables are:
Trust – ‘Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in
dealing with people?’ (1 if the respondent agrees that most people can be trusted); Female, young and elderly LFP
are dummies equal to 1 if the respondent is active in the labour market, 0 otherwise; Geographical mobility is a
dummy equal to 1 if the respondent lives with his/her parents. Countries are divided into four groups based on the
World Bank development classification. Control variables in this model include gender, age, age squared, marital
status, education level, survey fixed effects, country fixed effects and interactions between country and survey
fixed effects. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
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we can thereby formally reject at conventional levels of statistical significance that the effect of strong
family ties is the same across all countries.
These findings should not be interpreted as a rebuttal of Alesina and Giuliano (2010, 2011, 2013).
Our results do, however, provide a valuable extension by confirming important cross-country
heterogeneity in the effect of family ties – especially when looking at countries with the lowest levels
of economic and institutional development. Note also that these results cannot be explained by
potential differences in the level of variation observed in family ties across the four subsamples –
and particularly within the low-income countries. Figure 1 indeed illustrates that significant variation
exists within each group of countries, and that there are only marginal differences in the observed
standard deviations across groups.
The exception posed by the results on female LFP – where the estimated effect sizes are roughly
equivalent across all country groups – is interesting from a theoretical perspective. This indeed appears
to suggest that the positive family networks effect counteracting the negative family values effect in
low-income countries (see above) lacks substantive power for female LFP. Such interpretation could
be in line with Magruder (2010), who shows that the labour market advantage of family networks in
South Africa arises only for men, not for women. Family networks might thus be less useful for
women than for men in low-income countries, which becomes reflected in the relative homogeneity of
our findings across countries on this variable.8 Alternatively, however, it may also be that for female
LFP, the negative family values effect strengthens in equal measure to the family networks effect while
moving towards less developed countries.
As a preliminary step towards disentangling both explanations, we experimented with individuals’
actual employment status (that is, an indicator variable equal to 1 if employed, 0 otherwise) as an
alternative dependent variable. Assuming that traditional family values mainly affect the decision to
enter (or not) the labour market (see Alesina & Giuliano, 2010), looking at employment outcomes
given that individuals participate in the labour force provides an indicator for the strength of family
network effects on economic outcomes. Using a Heckman selection model to account for the effect of
family ties on female LFP (see above), the results indicate that strong family ties positively affect
female employment only in developing low-income countries (details upon request). Although this is
suggestive of the fact that women also benefit from a positive family networks effect, it clearly
requires further confirmation in future research.
3.2. Robustness Check Using Alternative Country Classification
In this section, we experiment with different measures of institutional quality to approximate economic
and institutional development. Specifically, we consider three indicators included in the World Bank’s
worldwide governance indicators (WGI). These aggregate information from dozens of indicators, and
are updated annually since 1996. The measures included here are: (i) Government Effectiveness,
which assesses the quality of policy formulation and implementation, public services and the civil
service as well as the degree of its independence from political pressures; (ii) Regulatory Quality,
which measures the government’s ability to formulate and implement high-quality policies and
regulations; (iii) Rule of Law, which evaluates ‘the quality of contract enforcement, property rights,
the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence’ (Worldwide Governance
Indicators, http://www.govindicators.org).
The WGI place each country in a percentile rank according to their position in the global
ranking. Higher positions thereby reflect better outcomes. To align our presentation to that of
previous tables, we use the original scores to divide countries in four distinct groups: that is, low
quality institutions (0–25); low–middle quality institutions (26–50); upper–middle quality institu-
tions (51–75); and high quality institutions (76–100). We then re-estimate Equation (1) separately
for these four groups of countries. The results concerning Government Effectiveness are provided
in Table 3 (Regulatory Quality and Rule of Law provide similar findings, which are available upon
request). Note that the sample is restricted here to data collected after 1995, since WGI data are
available only since 1996.
6 G. Daniele & B. Geys
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Despite the shorter period and the alternative operationalisation of countries’ level of development,
the results in Table 3 are a close replication of those in Table 2; that is, strong family ties have a
meaningful negative effect on trust, geographical mobility, female and youth LFP in countries with
high-quality formal institutions. However, moving towards less-developed countries in the left-hand
side of the table generally weakens this negative relation, and in some cases reverses it. This confirms
that our results are robust to different classifications of countries’ economic and institutional
development.
3.3. Robustness Check on Political Engagement
Our theoretical argument relies on the substantial potential economic value of family networks in less-
developed countries. We can assess this theoretical mechanism by evaluating whether the link between
Table 3. Alternative operationalisation of economic development.
Low
government
effectiveness
Lower–middle
government
effectiveness
Upper–middle
government
effectiveness
High
government
Effectiveness
Trust
Family ties 0.008 −0.003 −0.001 −0.011
(2.40)* (1.35) (0.31) (7.19)**
Controls A&G YES YES YES YES
R2 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.14
N 21,516 45,223 50,869 77,066
Women LFP
Family ties −0.006 −0.005 −0.005 −0.009
(1.47) (1.47) (1.60) (4.28)**
Controls A&G YES YES YES YES
R2 0.25 0.24 0.26 0.19
N 10,335 20,768 23,882 32,868
Young LFP
Family ties 0.004 −0.003 −0.007 −0.007
(1.08) (0.90) (2.63)** (3.62)**
Controls A&G YES YES YES YES
R2 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.14
N 21,516 45,223 50,869 77,066
Geographical Mobility
Family ties −0.002 −0.001 0.004 0.004
(0.72) (0.64) (1.80) (3.43)**
Controls A&G YES YES YES YES
R2 0.38 0.39 0.33 0.37
N 19,610 37,471 35,312 49,818
Elderly LFP
Family ties −0.017 −0.010 0.002 −0.006
(1.80) (1.37) (0.41) (1.43)
Controls A&G YES YES YES YES
R2 0.29 0.26 0.26 0.28
N 2,149 4,721 6,006 11,086
Notes: OLS estimations, t-statistics based on robust standard errors between brackets. The dependent variables are:
Trust – ‘Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in
dealing with people?’ (1 if the respondent agrees that most people can be trusted); Female, young and elderly LFP
are dummies equal to 1 if the respondent is active in the labour market, 0 otherwise; Geographical mobility is a
dummy equal to 1 if the respondent lives with his/her parents. Countries are divided into four groups based on
government effectiveness (see Section 3.2 for details). Control variables in this model include gender, age, age
squared, marital status, education level, survey fixed effects, country fixed effects and interactions between
country and survey fixed effects. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
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family ties and non-economic outcomes (such as political interest and political engagement) differs
depending on countries’ level of economic and institutional development. As the economic value of
family networks should have no effect on non-economic outcomes, we would not expect to observe
cross-country heterogeneity in the effect of family ties on non-economic outcomes. This test is
inspired by Alesina and Giuliano (2011), who show that the detrimental effects of strong family ties
extend to political interest and political engagement. The underlying argument relies on Banfield’s
(1967) theory of ‘amoral familism’, which holds that strong family ties might act as a substitute for
interest in public affairs. All attention under such ‘amoral familism’ is directed inwards – that is,
towards the needs and aspirations of one’s immediate family circle – and leads to a disregard for
external, non-family issues (for more details, see Alesina & Giuliano [2011]).
In Table 4, we report the results from re-estimating model (1) using different measures of political
participation as dependent variables. For reasons of comparability, we thereby use the same dependent
variables as Alesina and Giuliano (2011): that is, interest in politics (measured on a four-point scale
from (1) ‘not at all interested’ to (4) ‘very interested’), and individuals’ likelihood to sign a petition,
join a boycott, attend demonstrations and occupy buildings (measured on a three-point scale including
(1) ‘Would never do’, (2) ‘might do’ and (3) ‘have done’). Table 4 follows the same basic pattern
as Table 2.9
The results in Table 4 indicate that family ties negatively affect political participation for all
dependent variables included in the analysis – in line with the original results reported in Alesina
and Giuliano (2011). Importantly, this observation holds both for the entire set of countries
(column 1), as well as the four subsets based on World Bank development categories (columns
2 to 5). Overall, this provides further substantiation of our results in Tables 2 and 3, since a
heterogeneous effect of family ties appears only on the (economic) variables targeted by our
theoretical line of argument.
4. Conclusion
Recent work has shown that strong family ties have a detrimental effect on several sources of
economic growth including interpersonal trust, geographical mobility and young, female and elderly
LFP (Alesina et al., 2015; Alesina & Giuliano, 2010, 2011, 2013). In this article, we have argued that
allowance should be made for cross-country heterogeneity in this effect of family ties. The underlying
idea is that in developing countries, where institutions and markets are weaker (Dreher et al., 2014;
Gërxhani, 2004; Helmke & Levitsky, 2004), strong family ties will act as a substitute for the market
and can have important – and economically valuable – network effects that counteract the negative
effect of (traditional) family values.
Our empirical analysis provides evidence in line with this idea. Strong family ties only have a
substantive, statistically significant negative effect on labour force participation, trust and geogra-
phical mobility in developed high-income countries. This negative relation disappears – and can
even reverse – at lower levels of development, where family networks become more economically
valuable as a substitute for market access. These results are robust to different measures of
economic development. Moreover, a robustness check on non-economic outcomes corroborates
that the observed heterogeneity may indeed derive from the economic value of family networks in
under-developed countries.
These results not only highlight the importance of accounting for the various, and sometimes
contrasting, effects of strong family ties on economic behaviour, but also raise a number of important
avenues for future research. For instance, they emphasise the need for a deeper understanding of the
exact relations and trade-offs between formal and informal institutions (such as the family). While
the family unit has rightly been recognised as central to economic behaviour, our knowledge of how
the role of family ties interacts with the effects of formal institutions remains overly limited. A recent
exception to this general trend is Durante, Labartino, and Perotti (2015), who show that a 1998
legislative reform in Italy weakening the institutional constraints on the academic hiring process
8 G. Daniele & B. Geys
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caused a significant increase in the prevalence and persistence of family-based hiring practices only in
areas characterised by low civic capital. Similarly, Alesina et al. (2015) argue that the deregulation of
formal labour market institutions ‘requires geographical mobility’, which in turn ‘requires relatively
weak family ties’. Still, as we have shown, the negative link between strong family ties and
geographical mobility holds only in a subset of affluent countries, such that the apparent general
nature of their conclusion would require a more in-depth assessment in future research.
Table 4. Political engagement.
Entire
sample
Low
income
Low–middle
income
Upper–middle
income
High
income
Interest in politics
Family ties −0.013 −0.016 0.002 −0.024 −0.011
(7.05)** (2.71)** (0.43) (6.47)** (4.02)**
Controls A&G YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.15 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.17
N 212,931 28,490 47,915 55,254 77,788
Sign petition
Family ties −0.026 −0.037 −0.024 −0.032 −0.040
(17.21)** (7.94)** (6.55)** (11.06)** (17.41)**
Controls A&G YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.28 0.12 0.13 0.18 0.25
N 206,678 26,135 43,409 57,856 76,071
Joining in boycotts
Family ties −0.045 −0.035 −0.028 −0.039 −0.055
(33.22)** (8.68)** (9.06)** (15.61)** (25.62)**
Controls A&G YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.19 0.15 0.18 0.14 0.20
N 201,627 26,203 41,992 57,080 73,177
Attending demonstrations
Family ties −0.031 −0.022 −0.022 −0.023 −0.040
(20.81)** (4.48)** (6.19)** (8.17)** (17.41)**
Controls A&G YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.16 0.11 0.16 0.10 0.17
N 207,089 26,527 44,144 57,857 75,382
Joining strikes
Family ties −0.039 −0.041 −0.024 −0.037 −0.044
(31.73)** (10.52)** (9.42)** (16.00)** (22.89)**
Controls A&G YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.11
N 200,626 26,143 43,673 56,137 71,675
Occupying buildings
Family ties −0.028 −0.020 −0.011 −0.030 −0.034
(28.98)** (8.08)** (5.90)** (15.67)** (21.36)**
Controls A&G YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.10 0.15 0.04 0.08 0.11
N 199,111 25,851 43,534 56,869 69,831
Notes: OLS estimations, t-statistics based on robust standard errors between brackets. ‘Interest in politics’ is
measured as: ‘How interested would you say you are in politics?’ (from (1) not at all interested to (4) very
interested). The remaining dependent variables derive from the following question: ‘I’m going to read out some
forms of political action that people can take, and I’d like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any
of these things (3), whether you might do it (2) or would never under any circumstances do it (1): Signing a
petition; Joining in boycotts; Attending lawful demonstrations; Joining unofficial strikes; Occupying buildings or
factories.’ Countries are divided into four groups based on the World Bank development classification. Control
variables in this model include gender, age, age squared, marital status, education level, survey fixed effects,
country fixed effects and interactions between country and survey fixed effects. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
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Clearly, a better understanding of such interactions between formal and informal institutions is of
critical importance to a more accurate design of public policies. In fact, since similar self-reported
attitudes towards family ties lead to opposite outcomes depending on the socio-economic character-
istics of the country, it is important for public policy-makers aiming at, for instance, labour market
regulation, redistributive policies, education and welfare provision to properly account for the exact
influence of family ties in their setting.10
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Notes
1. A similar network mechanism has also been brought forward to explain the formation and success of political dynasties (Dal
Bó, Dal Bó, & Snyder, 2009; Daniele, 2015). Likewise, Mastrobuoni (2015) convincingly documents the economic value of
network connections within the Italian-American mafia in the 1960s.
2. A large literature links interpersonal trust to economic growth and development. For a recent discussion of this extensive
literature and an integrative contribution to it, see Bjørnskov and Méon (2013).
3. Specifically, the first question asks ‘How important is family in your life?’ and takes values from 1 (not important at all) to 4
(very important). The second question measures respondents’ agreement with one of two statements: (1) ‘One does not have
the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it’; (2) ‘Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one’s parents
are, one must always love and respect them’. The third and final question again measures respondents’ agreement with one
of two statements: (1) ‘Parents have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own wellbeing for the sake
of their children’; (2) ‘It is the parents’ duty to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own wellbeing’.
4. The eigenvalue of the first factor deriving from this PCA is equal to 1.24, and it explains 41.9 per cent of the variance in
responses. The factor loadings for each element included in the PCA exceeds 0.53.
5. For more information on this classification, see http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/a-short-history. Note
also that while we report only the split-sample results in detail below, models with interaction effects provide similar results.
For ease of interpretation, Figure A1 in the Online Appendix visualises the marginal effect of family ties across the different
country groups in these interaction models, which are estimated using multilevel models – where individuals (level 1) are
nested within countries (level 2) and the family ties variable is interacted with the World Bank classification index (details
available upon request).
6. Our results do not change if we use logit or probit models instead of OLS (available upon request).
7. The slight difference in our results is due to our specification of respondents’ marital status. Alesina and Giuliano set the
indicator variable for married individuals to 1 only for individuals declaring to be ‘living together as married (but not
married)’, while we also set it to 1 for married individuals. Although this does not affect any of the results reported below,
and we can exactly replicate Alesina and Giuliano’s original results using their specification, we consider our operationa-
lisation more appropriate.
8. Magruder (2010) studies formal labour markets, and it is not intuitively clear whether similar gender differences in
the labour market advantage of family networks would likewise arise in informal labour markets. Unfortunately, the
EVS/WVS does not differentiate between formal and informal labour markets, which implies that we cannot
empirically verify such potential formal–informal sector differences. This clearly remains an important avenue for
future research.
9. Also in this case, we refer to Alesina and Giuliano (2011) for detailed tests of the direction of causality.
10. Interestingly, recent work has started taking limited steps towards such a line of research. Brumm and Brumm (2014),
for instance, show that intra-family altruism might hinder economic reforms even in periods of economic crisis, while
Alesina et al. (2015) model a game where societies characterised by strong family ties vote for stricter labour market
regulation.
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